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SHOW ME THE MONEY: HOW THE ABA MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT CAN
DETER NCAA RULES VIOLATIONS
INVOLVING SPORTS AGENTS
& COLLEGE ATHLETES
INTRODUCTION
The National Collegiate Athletic Association's ("NCAA") funda-
mental purpose is "to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral
part of the educational program and the athlete as an integral part of
the student body and, by so doing, retain a clear line of demarcation
between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports."' This line is
becoming increasingly blurred as major universities such as the Uni-
versity of Southern California ("USC"),2 the University of North Car-
olina ("UNC"), 3  the University of Miami, 4  and others5  are
investigated for violating NCAA bylaws. When the NCAA conducts
1. NCAA CONSTITUTION, OPERATING BYI.AWS & ADMINISTRATIVE BYLAWS, § 1.3.1, re-
printed in 2010-11 NCAA Division I Manual, available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/
productdownloads/D 11 .pdf [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL].
2. Madison Gray, USC Trojans Get Black Eye Over Reggie Bush Scandal, TIMu, June 10,
2010, available at http://newsfeed.time.com/2010/06/10/usc-trojans-get-black-eye-over-reggie-
bush-scandal/.
3. Darren Heitner, The UNC Football Scandal, SPORTs AGENT BrLoG (July 16, 2010, 12:02
PM), http:l/www.sportsagentblog.com2OlOlO7ll6/the-unc-football-standa/.
4. Miami is recently tied up in one of the largest scandals to hit the NCAA involving booster/
agent Nevin Shapiro, a convicted felon, who alleges that he provided thousands of impermissible
benefits to University of Miami players. Charles Robinson, Renegade Miami Football Booster
Spells Out Illicit Benefits to Players, YAIIOO! SPORTS (Aug. 16, 2011, 5:37 PM), http://sports.
yahoo.com/investigations/news?slug=cr-renegade-miamibooster-detailsillicit-benefits_0816
11.
5. See John Taylor, Alabama May Be Latest School Entangled In Growing Player-Agent Scan-
dal, NBCSPowrS.cOM (July 20, 2010, 6:39 PM), http://collegefootballtalk.nbcsports.coml2010/07/
20/alabama-may-be-latest-school-entangled-in-growing-player-agent-scandal/ (discussing the
possible investigation into South Carolina football player Weslye Saunders, Alabama football
player Marcel Dareus, and Florida football player Maurkice Pouncey for accepting gifts from
agents); see also Chris Low, Report: Trips to Miami Under Scrutiny, ESPN.coM (July 23, 2010,
11:55 AM), http://sports.espn.go.comlncf/news/story?id=5402211 (implicating University of
Georgia wide receiver A.J. Green in rumors of the South Beach agent party). Marcel Dareus is
alleged to have attended a party at an agent's house in South Beach. Taylor, supra note 5.
Weslye Saunders is alleged to have also been at the party in South Beach and investigators are
looking into who paid for the plane tickets and accommodations. Taylor, supra note 5. Maur-
kice Pouncey is alleged to have received up to $100,000 from the runner of an unnamed sports
agent. Taylor, supra note 5.
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an investigation and uncovers a violation of a bylaw, student-athletes
may be exposed in the media, their eligibility to participate in games
and events may be stripped, and their scholarships may be revoked. 6
While some high-profile players are fortunate enough to only receive
minimal punishment,7 the school administration, athletic director, and
coach are publicly questioned as to their involvement and why they
did not prevent the violations from occurring. 8 The NCAA may then
prohibit post-season appearances, forfeit university athletic scholar-
ships, and/or impose strict recruiting standards, which make it difficult
to obtain high caliber athletes.9 Somehow the agent avoids the media
frenzy and merely loses a potential client.
Universities and athletes suffer the harshest penalties in the after-
math of athlete agent scandals. Although states have adopted statutes
to help prosecute violators, these agents often escape the ordeal pro-
fessionally unscathed. 10 Athletes, universities, and coaches are gener-
ally forced to answer to the media after word of the scandal has been
6. See Aaron Beard, Little Issues Apology After NCAA Ruling, TiIE BOSTON GLOBIE, http://
www.boston.com/sports/colleges/football/articles/201 0/10/12/littleissues-apology-after ncaa-
ruling/ (last visited Nov.19, 2011) (reporting that North Carolina wide receiver Greg Little and
defensive end Robert Quinn were declared by the NCAA as ineligible for accepting gifts and
travel accommodations from an agent and both were released from the football team, exposed
by the media, and lost their scholarships).
7. See Marcel Dareus of Alabama Ruled Ineligible for Two Games, FANIOtJSI (Sept. 2, 2010,
8:50 PM), http://ncaafootball.fanhouse.com/2010/09/02/marcel1-dareus-of-alabama-ruled-ineligi-
ble-for-two-games?icid=sphere-newsaol-inpage fanhouse2 (stating that Marcel Dareus, an out-
standing football player for the University of Alabama, was caught receiving nearly $2,000 worth
of improper gifts and travel accommodations from an agent and was ordered by the NCAA to
repay $1,787 to the charity of his choice before regaining his eligibility without further
sanctions).
8. For instance, Pete Carroll, the former head coach of the University of Southern California
football team was asked how the Reggie Bush scandal happened and he responded by saying,
"'It just did. We didn't have the awareness to know. I wish I would have had the awareness I
have now, going back."' Danny O'Neil, Pete Carroll's Story Looks Different Amid All the Fall-
out, TiiE SEATri TIMES, July 16, 2010, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/danny
oneil/2012378504_onei117.html.
9. Billy Witz, Trojans' Culture of Fun Meets Era of Compliance, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2010,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/22/sports/ncaafootbalU22usc.html (referring to the
NCAA imposing 2 years of probation resulting in the forfeiture of the opportunity to attend two
postseason bowl games and the loss of 30 scholarships on the University of Southern California
during the wake of the Reggie Bush scandal). Participation in a postseason bowl game is the
ultimate goal for a college football team because of the money involved. See Ethan Trex, Bow-
ling for No Dollars, College Bowl Game Economics, MENT^A._FLoss BLoG (Jan. 6, 2011, 3:31
PM), http://www.mentalfloss.com/blogs/archives/78756 (noting that the 2010 national champion-
ship game resulted in a payout of close to $2 million each to the University of Texas and the
University of Alabama).
10. Diane Sudia & Rob Remis, The History Behind Athlete Agent Regulation and the "Slam
Dunking of Statutory Hurdles," 8 VIL- . SPORTs & ENT. L.J. 67, 84-91 (2001) (discussing the state
statutes enacted and the Federal Uniform Athlete Agents Act proffered by the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and how agents may evade punishment).
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leaked.11 However, it is often easiest for the university to recover be-
cause it can comply with the sanctions and reinvest the money it earns
through its athletic department to rebuild its reputation.1 2
While the university may rebuild itself, the athlete's life may be es-
sentially over in terms of playing an intercollegiate sport or receiving
an education. Many college athletes come from poverty and rely on
their athletic ability to earn a scholarship to afford the high price of a
college degree.1 3 These promising individuals, some of whom have
the prospect of earning millions of dollars playing professional sports
or, in the alternative, would at least have a quality education to rely
on, may be substantially damaged.' 4
This problematic situation occurs because agents, universities, and
student-athletes do not have enough incentive to act ethically in an
inherently competitive and unethical environment. The current sys-
tem has failed because the NCAA has no legal authority to discipline
agents.15 An NCAA bylaw related to agents has even been declared
11. Pete Carroll was scrutinized in the media during the Reggie Bush scandal. See O'Neil,
supra note 7. USC athletic director Pat Haden issued statements to combat media pressure and
emphasized that USC would become a leader in combating unethical athlete agents. See Holly
Anderson, Pat Haden Calls for USC to Lead Fight Against Rogue Agents, SB NATIoN, Los
ANGELEiS (Oct. 14, 2010, 12:04 PM), http:l/losangeles.sbnation.com/usc-trojans/201010/1417513
91/pat-haden-statement-agents-paying-players-sports-illustrated (detailing Haden's statements
to repair USC's athletic department).
12. USC has taken steps to repair its reputation by firing the athletic director under which the
wrongdoing occurred, hiring Pat Haden, returning Reggie Bush's Heisman trophy (awarded for
the most outstanding player in college football each year), and complying with the NCAA sanc-
tions. USC Hires Haden as AD, Will Return Bush's Heisman, SPORTINc, Nr ws, July 20, 2010,
available at http://www.sportingnews.com/ncaa-football/story/2010-07-20/report-haden-replace-
garrett-usc-ad.
13. See, e.g., Kari Bethel, Allen Iverson, ENCYCLOPEINA.COM, http://www.encyclopedia.com
topic/Allenjverson.aspx (last visited Oct. 14, 2010, 8:33 PM) ("Iverson and his two half-sisters
lived with his mother in a poverty-stricken neighborhood of Hampton"); see also Michael Vick
Biography, BIOGRAriiY.COM, http://www.biography.com/articles/Michael-Vick-241100?part=O
(last visited Oct. 21, 2010) (noting that "Vick grew up in a tough area of his hometown, a place
dominated by drugs and gang activity.").
14. Maurice Clarett, an outstanding freshman running back for the Ohio State University, was
expelled from school after he was found to have taken money from boosters and agents, such as
Josh Luchs. See Tom Friend & Ryan Hockensmith, Clarett Claims Cash, Cars Among Benefits,
ESPN.coM (Nov. 9, 2004) http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/newslstory?id=1919059 (noting that
Clarett was projected as a first round draft pick, but was denied the opportunity to enter the
NFL draft because he took benefits and was expelled from Ohio State as a freshman and was
consequently too young to enter the draft); see also George Dohrmann, Confessions of an
Agent, SPORrs ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 18, 2010, (Magazine), available at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.
com/2010/magazine/10/12/agent/index.html?hpt=C2 (alleging that agents provided benefits to
Clarett).
15. Diane Sudia & Rob Remis, Statutory Regulation of Agent Gifts to Athletes, 10 S-roN
HALL J. SPowr L. 265, 268-69 (2000); see also Cottrell v. NCAA, 975 So.2d 306 (Ala. 2007)
(addressing an action against the recruiting coordinator and coaches of the University of Ala-
bama football program involving an athlete signing a contract with an agent). Alabama was
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void by an Ohio state court.' 6 A solution must be found to preserve
the integrity of college sports and bring the line of demarcation back
into focus.
Part I of this Comment provides a background of the regulation of
athlete agents and details some of the more recent scandals. Part II
focuses on why the current regulations have generally failed to deter
improper conduct committed by athlete agents. Part III offers a solu-
tion founded on the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and
how they may be used to deter improper agent practices in college
athletics.
I. RECENT SCANDALS AND THE STATE OF
ATHLETE AGENT REGULATION
Athlete agents are currently regulated by a blend of poorly drafted
state statutes and untested federal acts. While there are penalties in
place for unethical athlete agents, they have failed to deter agents
from violating NCAA bylaws. Nearly every season, new allegations
of student-athletes receiving improper benefits emerge and new uni-
versity athletic departments are investigated.
A. Recent Scandals in College Athletics
College athletes have been receiving improper benefits from agents
and boosters for decades. 17 With billions of dollars involved in college
athletics and product marketing, this is not surprising.' 8 Agents com-
pete intensely to sign the most talented and marketable athletes. 19
sanctioned by the NCAA while the agent was not joined in the action and barely mentioned in
the case. Id. at 317-18.
16. Brandon D. Morgan, Oliver v. NCAA: NCAA's No Agent Rule Called Out, But Remains
Safe, 17 Si'owrs L. J. 303, 310 (2010).
17. See generally Kelly W. Bhirdo, Linda A. Haviland & Thomas J. Warth, McCormack v.
National Collegiate Athletic Association: College Athletic Sanctions From An Antitrust and Civil
Rights Perspective, 15 J.C. & U.L. 459 (1989) (noting that Southern Methodist University re-
ceived a cancellation of its 1987 regular football season and had its 1988 season limited to only
eight games, which had to be played at the opponents' location, because the players on the
football team were being paid by the boosters to play for SMU). Ohio State University head
football coach Jim Tressel was involved in a similar scandal during his tenure as head coach at
Youngstown State University. Adam Lazarus, Cam Newton and the Top 50 Scandals in College
Football History, BLEACUFR REPORT (Dec. 2, 2010), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/531572-
cam-newton-and-the-top-50-scandals-in-college-football-history#page/7.
18. For college basketball alone, CBS paid the NCAA $2.13 billion for exclusive rights to
broadcast several NCAA college basketball championship games. Heide B. Malhotra, College
Basketball: A Billion Dollar Business, Tim Eocti TIMES (May 10, 2010), http://www.theepoch
times.com/n2/contentlview/35140/.
19. Agents make their money from signing contracts with athletes that stipulate to the agent
receiving 2-3% of the athlete's contract amount with the professional team who the athlete signs
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Recently, a scandal involved improper gifts to University of North
Carolina football players.20 After an investigation launched in sum-
mer 2010, the NCAA declared defensive end Robert Quinn and re-
ceiver Greg Little permanently ineligible after it concluded that both
players had received jewelry and travel accommodations from
agents.2' The university then removed defensive tackle Marvin Austin
from the team after the NCAA concluded that Austin had received up
to $13,000 in improper benefits from an agent.22
The investigation that led to the termination of these players was
initiated by rumors of a party held by an agent in Miami.2 3 Several
prominent college players from major universities such as UNC, the
University of South Carolina, and the University of Alabama were
rumored to have attended.24 These players allegedly received money
for flights, hotels, and other expenses.25 Moreover, University of
Florida offensive lineman Maurkice Pouncey allegedly received up to
$100,000 of benefits from an agent at the party.26
Perhaps the most startling recent scandal involved Reggie Bush
during his tenure as a running back for USC.27 After a four year in-
vestigation, the NCAA sanctioned USC by declaring its football team
ineligible for two postseasons, deducting ten scholarships for each of
the next three seasons,28 and stripping USC of its 2004 BCS29 National
with. Michael McCann, Show Me 97 Percent of the Money: NFL Agent Maximum Fee to Remain
at 3 Percent, SRowrs LAW Bi-oG (April 15, 2006,12:52 AM), http://sports-law.blogspot.com/2006/
04/show-me-97-percent-of-money-nfl-agent.html.
20. Beard, supra note 6.
21. Beard, supra note 6.
22. Beard, supra note 6. See also Heitner, supra note 3 (discussing how Austin was seen driv-
ing an agent's car and also staying at his apartment while the agent was out of town).
23. Taylor, supra note 5.
24. Taylor, supra note 5.
25. Taylor, supra note 5.
26. Taylor, supra note 5.
27. Gray, supra note 2. Reggie Bush was a star running back at USC during which he won the
Heisman trophy (given for the best player in college football that year) and helped the team win
a national championship. See Reggie Bush Biography, REGOO BUSHONILINI.COM, http://www.
reggiebushonline.com/reggie-bush-biography.php, (last visited Jan. 10, 2011) (noting that Bush
was considered one of the best college running backs of the decade and now plays in the Na-
tional Football League for the New Orleans Saints).
28. Gray, supra note 2. ESPN's Tom Luginbill describes why this punishment is severe:
When a program loses scholarships, it has fewer talented bodies on its roster, so
there's a significant drop-off between the top player and the next player on the depth
chart. In today's world of rotating in players and situational substitutions, that's huge.
Coaches already complain about having only 85 scholarships. Now USC is going to be
down 10 a year, and there's a trickle-down effect that will impact how the Trojans set
up their rotations, their depth and how they overcome injuries to players.
Tom Luginbill, Pressure Mounts on Kiffin & Co., ESPN.COM (June 10, 2010), http://sports.espn.
go.com/ncaa/recruiting/football/news/story?id=5271822. Luginbill further states:
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Championship. 30 The punishment was a result of allegations that
Bush's parents were provided a home in exchange for Bush's agree-
ment to sign a representation contract with an agent.31 Earlier in the
year, USC was forced by the NCAA to impose sanctions on its
women's tennis team and men's basketball team for similar viola-
tions.32 These recent issues have led many to question whether the
athletic programs at USC would have been as successful 33 without the
alleged cheating. 34 USC has been accused of "having too much fun"
and turning their head while the violations occurred. 35 Incoming ath-
letic director Pat Haden has taken a tougher stance on NCAA compli-
ance and USC is in the process of adding two more compliance
officers to their athletic department. 36
Yahoo! Sports conducted its own investigation of USC and Reggie
Bush and published a surprising account of what benefits may have
been given to the Bush family. 37 The agents allegedly involved are
Bush's current agent Michael Ornstein and previous agents Michael
Michaels and Lloyd Lake.38 According to the report, Bush's family
was provided $529.20 in airfare for his mother, stepfather, and brother
to attend a USC game in Berkeley, California. 39 In addition, the Bush
This punishment makes the jobs of coach Lane Kiffin and his assistants that much
harder, as their margin for error goes from small to nonexistent. Recruiting is already
tough enough. Coaches have to project the physical and mental potential of a 17-year-
old not only on the field but also in the classroom and away from his family. Now,
USC's coaches will have to be correct nearly 100 percent of the time because they'll
have fewer scholarships to give out. The pressure will rise in every meeting about every
player because coaches will know they can't afford to miss on a kid.
Id.
29. BCS stands for "bowl championship series." This is the committee responsible for creat-
ing the schedule of postseason bowls for Division I college football.
30. Lynn Zinser, U.S.C. Loses Its 2004 B.C.S. National Championship, N.Y. TIMIqs, June 6,
2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/07/sports/ncaafootball/usc-stripped-of-2004-
bcs-national-championship.html?_r=l &scp=l&sq=usc%20national %20title&st=cse (noting that
this is the first time the NCAA has ever stripped a football team of its consensus national
championship).
31. Gray, supra note 2.
32. Gray, supra note 2.
33. Bush's tenure at USC lasted from 2003-05 during which the team appeared in the Rose
Bowl twice, the Orange Bowl once, won the national championship in 2004, and had an overall
record of 37-2.
34. Witz, supra note 9.
35. Witz, supra note 9.
36. Witz, supra note 9. Haden was hired in July 2010 to replace athletic director Mike Gar-
rett, under whose tenure the Reggie Bush scandal occurred. Pat Haden Hired as USC's AD,
Koiojv.coM (July 20, 2010, 2:35 PM), http://www.kolotv.com/sports/headlines/98867559.html.
37. Charles Robinson & Jason Cole, Cash and Carry, YAhloo! Si'ORTiS, http://rivals.yahoo.
com/ncaa/footbalL/news?slug=ys-bushprobe (last visited Oct. 21, 2010).
38. Id.
39. Id.
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family was provided a limousine and stayed at the Ritz-Carlton hotel
during the same trip.40 Bush was also provided suits during the Heis-
man Trophy presentation weekend and his family was provided a lim-
ousine for transportation. 4 Yahoo! Sports uncovered that weekly
payments of $1,500 were presented to the Bush family along with a
makeover for Bush's mother.42 It was also revealed that these agents
paid for numerous hotel stays for Bush, provided him with money for
a car, paid off some of the Bush family's debt, and permitted Bush's
family to live in a $700,000 house rent-free for a year.4 3 All of the
expenses were alleged to total over $100,000, which begs the question
of how these benefits went unnoticed by then-head football coach
Pete Carroll and USC.44
Agents' exploitation of college athletes and general lack of respect
for the sanctity of college football has led coaches at major programs
to lash out. Recently, head football coach Nick Saban 45 of the Uni-
versity of Alabama classified agents as "pimps"'46 and questioned
whether the National Football League ("NFL") should be permitted
to send scouts to attend college practices. 47 Saban further stated that
what the "NFL Players Association and the NFL need to do is if any
agent breaks a rule and causes ineligibility for a player, they should
suspend [the agent's] license for a year or two."' 48 Saban's tirade fol-
lowed allegations of Alabama football player Marcel Dareus receiving
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. id. The house belonged to one of the agents, Michaels, who was trying to sign Bush to a
contract.
44. Id.
45. Along with briefly coaching the Miami Dolphins in the NFL, Nick Saban won a national
championship as Alabama's head football coach in 2009 and as Louisiana State's head football
coach in 2003. Nick Saban, ROi.i T)E.COM, http://www.rolltide.com/sports/m-footbl/mtt/saban-
nick00.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2011).
46. Ray Glier, With a Player Under Investigation, Saban Criticizes Agents, N.Y. TiM]S, July,
22, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/22/sports/ncaafootball/22agents.html?-r=l
&ref=sports. "I [Saban] don't think it's anything but greed that's creating it right now on behalf
of the agents. The agents that do this-and I hate to say this, but how are they any better than a
pimp?" John Zenor, Saban Compares Unprincipled Agents to 'Pimps', NBCSPORTS.COM (July
21, 2010), http://nbcsports.msnbc.com/id/38347909/ns/sports-college-football/.
47. Ivan Maisel & Mark Schlabach, Dareus May Have Attended Agent's Party, ESPN.coM
(July 22, 2010, 12:44 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=5396236 ("'I'm [Saban]
about ready for college football to say, 'Let's just throw the NFL out. Don't let them evaluate
players. Don't let them talk to players. Let them do it at the combine. If they are not going to
help us, why should we help them?"'). Many college football teams open up their practices to
scouts, who evaluate players for potential in the NFL. Brent Zwerneman, Sherman Camp Al-
ways Open to NFL ScOutS, CHRON.COM (Aug. 14, 2010), http://blogs.chron.com/aggies/2010/08/
sherman camp-always open-to nf_2.html.
48. Maisel, supra note 47.
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improper benefits from an agent. 49 Saban has also made it clear that
he believes that schools should not be penalized for the actions of the
agents and players. 50
At least one prominent coach has come up with his own idea to
prevent athlete agents from tarnishing the reputation of college athlet-
ics. University of Oklahoma head football coach Bob Stoops suggests
giving amnesty to players who report agent violations even after they
may have been involved themselves. 51 Stoops believes NCAA bylaws
penalize only universities and athletes, which decreases incentives for
schools to conduct their own investigations. 52 He claims that during
his twelve years of coaching college football, the athlete agent prob-
lem is worse than ever. 53 Stoops' suggestion creates an incentive for
players to report prohibited conduct by agents and provides a partial
solution to the problem. It is important to note that student-athletes
are implicitly allowed to meet with agents under NCAA rules.54
However, they are expressly prohibited from signing contracts or ac-
cepting benefits from agents. 55
B. The State of Athlete Agent Regulation
The crux of the regulation surrounding college athletics is the
NCAA manual containing the operating bylaws, which prohibit stu-
dent-athletes from receiving any benefits from agents. 56 If the bylaws
did not exist, there would be few statutes regulating agents.57 The few
49. ld.
50. Id.
51. Bob Stoops: Amnesty for Some Players, ESPN.cOM (Sept. 2, 2010, 12:55 PM), http://sports.
espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=5522685&campaign=rss&source= ESPNHeadlines [hereinafter
ESPN.coM]. As the current head coach of Oklahoma University football team, Bob Stoops won
a national championship and has built a reputation as one of the best coaches in the country.
Bob Stoops, SOONnR S ORrIs.coM, http://www.soonersports.com/school-bio/bob-stoops.html,
(last visited Jan. 11, 2011).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. There is no rule in the NCCA bylaws that prohibit student athletes from meeting or
talking to an agent as long as there is no contract negotiation or benefits being conferred.
55. Id. "An individual shall be ineligible for participation in an intercollegiate sport if he or
she ever has agreed (orally or in writing) to be represented by an agent for the purpose of
marketing his or her athletics ability or reputation in that sport." NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1,
at § 12.3.1.
56. See discussion infra Subsection I.B.2.a (detailing the purpose of the NCAA Manual and
the relevant bylaws dealing with contact between student athletes and agents).
57. Sudia, supra note 10, at 70 ("The real reason legislatures enact athlete agent statutes di-
rectly transcends from the NCAA rules and regulations. Were it not for the NCAA, state legis-
latures likely would not find a need to regulate athlete agents.").
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state and federal regulations that do exist resemble the NCAA bylaws
and provide the NCAA with indirect enforcement ability. 58
1. How Agents Sign College Athletes
Before discussing the state of athlete agent regulation, it is impor-
tant to provide an example of the process by which unethical agents
sign athletes to representation contracts. Many different techniques
are employed by these agents. For example, former agent Josh Luchs
explained the process in an interview with Sports Illustrated, in which
he recounted his first experience attempting to sign a student-athlete,
Kanavis McGhee. 59 Luchs flew to Colorado and figured out where
McGhee lived.60 Luchs sat outside McGhee's dormitory room until
he arrived home from practice. 61 McGhee allowed Luchs into his
room and Luchs explained to him that he was an agent and could help
him out.62 McGhee responded by requesting $2,500 to help prevent
his mother from being evicted from her home, which Luchs eventually
provided after some deliberation. 63 Although Luchs violated NCAA
rules to accommodate McGhee, he did not end up representing him.64
This is a simplified version of how agents make contact with ath-
letes. Many independent, non-lawyer agents set up their own business
with aspirations of signing a major client that will make them mil-
lions.65 Because they are not lawyers, they have no ethical code to
follow but their own.66 With the state of regulation as it is now, the
average person only needs to file a license form with the state to be-
come a registered sports agent.
58. See discussion infra Subsection I.B.2.b (explaining that state statutes penalize the same
behavior as the NCAA bylaws).
59. Dohrmann, supra note 14 (noting that Kanavis McGhee was a standout on the University
of Colorado football team and was "a big, pass-rushing linebacker who was expected to be a high
pick in the 1991 NFL draft").
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Landis Cox, Targeting Sports Agents with the Mail Fraud Statute: United States v. Norby
Walters & Lloyd Bloom, 41 DUKF L.J. 1157, 1162 (1992) (discussing that agent Lloyd Bloom, a
former high school football player, and Norby Walters joined to start their own agency wherein
Bloom had no experience as an agent).
66. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct normally do not apply to non-lawyers and
technically do not apply to lawyers until adopted and enforced by the state. Sr-euEN GiLLEPS
iwF AL., RciuI.ATION o17 LAWYERS: STATUrES AND STANIARDS 3 (2010).
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2. The Current Regulatory Scheme
The current regulatory scheme is made up of three different types
of regulations. The NCAA annually publishes rules that each member
university must follow. 67 Similar rules are found in state legislatures
in the form of statutes. 68 Congress has also passed acts involving the
regulation of athlete agents. 69
a. NCAA Operating Bylaws
The NCAA annually publishes a set of bylaws that regulate the ac-
tivities of member institutions.70 Article 12 lists prohibitions on agent
activity involving student-athletes and the penalties the players and
universities face for violations.71 Under section 12.01.1, only amateurs
are allowed to participate in NCAA intercollegiate events.72 A stu-
dent-athlete will lose amateur status and be declared ineligible to par-
ticipate in NCAA sporting events if the student-athlete receives any
of the prohibited forms of pay.73 The NCAA prohibits these forms of
pay: salary, gratuity, or compensation; 74 division or split of surplus;
75
educational expenses;76 and expenses, awards, and benefits.77 The
class of prohibited pay that invokes the most controversy involves ex-
penses, awards, and benefits that agents offer to student-athletes. Sec-
tion 12.3.1 provides:
An individual shall be ineligible for participation in an intercollegi-
ate sport if he or she ever has agreed (orally or in writing) to be
represented by an agent for the purpose of marketing his or her
athletics ability or reputation in that sport. Further, an agency con-
tract not specifically limited in writing to a sport or particular sports
shall be deemed applicable to all sports, and the individual shall be
ineligible to participate in any sport.78
This bylaw prohibits contract execution between agents and stu-
dent-athletes. The NCAA further describes the types of gifts that will
render a student-athlete ineligible in section 12.3.1.2:
67. See discussion infra Subsection 1.2.B.a (discussing the NCAA bylaws).
68. See discussion infra Subsection 1.2.B.b (discussing state statutes and licensing
requirements).
69. See discussion infra Subsection 1.2.B.c (discussing Congress' regulation of agents).
70. See generally NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1 (detailing every NCAA bylaw).
71. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at § 12.
72. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at § 12.01.1.
73. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at § 12.1.2.1.
74. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at § 12.1.2.1.1.
75. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at § 12.1.2.1.2.
76. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at § 12.1.2.1.3.
77. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at § 12.1.2.1.4.
78. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at § 12.3.1.
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An individual shall be ineligible per Bylaw 12.3.1 if he or she (or his
or her relatives or friends) accepts transportation or other benefits
from:
(a) Any person who represents any individual in the marketing of
his or her athletics ability. The receipt of such expenses constitutes
compensation based on athletics skill and is an extra benefit not
available to the student body in general; or
(b) An agent, even if the agent has indicated that he or she has no
interest in representing the student-athlete in the marketing of his
or her athletics ability or reputation and does not represent individ-
uals in the student-athlete's sport.7 9
Notice that the bylaw includes the term "or his or her relatives or
friends." The inclusion of this language is important because many
agents attempt to conceal their direct solicitation of a student-athlete
by providing the gifts to the athlete's family or friends.8 0
Interestingly, the NCAA provides an exception to the rule in Arti-
cle 16 of the NCAA Manual.81 If a student-athlete, family member, or
friend receives an improper gift from an agent, but can prove that the
same benefit is "generally available" to the rest of the student body or
a certain group of the student body that is unrelated to athletics, the
gift will not render the student-athlete ineligible. 82 Another exception
exists under section 16.01.1.1, which allows a student-athlete who has
received a prohibited gift of $100 or less to repay the gift to the charity
of their choice to regain their eligibility.8 3 It is also important to note
that the NCAA does not place a minimum or maximum dollar
amount on the gift to an athlete in determining whether it is im-
proper.84 Any type of gift that has monetary value potentially renders
a student-athlete ineligible for the rest of his or her college career. 85
79. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at §§ 12.3.1.2, 16.01.1 (applying the no gift rule to any
person, not just agents in general).
80. See Robinson, supra note 37 (reporting that many of the benefits given to Reggie Bush
were for the benefit of his family).
81. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at § 16.02.3 ("Receipt of a benefit by student-athletes or
their relatives or friends is not a violation of NCAA legislation if it is demonstrated that the
same benefit is generally available to the institution's students or their relatives or friends or to a
particular segment of the student body (for example, international students, minority students)
determined on a basis unrelated to athletics ability.").
82. Id.
83. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at § 16.01.1.1 ("For violations of Bylaw 16 in which the
value of the benefit is $100 or less, the eligibility of the student-athlete shall not be affected
conditioned upon the student-athlete repaying the value of the benefit to a charity of his or her
choice. The student-athlete, however, shall remain ineligible from the time the institution has
knowledge of receipt of the impermissible benefit until the student-athlete repays the benefit.").
84. Sudia, supra note 15, at 271.
85. Id.
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Unfortunately, the NCAA lacks the authority to penalize athletes
or agents.86 It can only penalize schools because they are member
institutions pursuant to section 14.11.1.87 Therefore, it indirectly pun-
ishes athletes by mandating that the university sanction athletes for
violations of the bylaws.88 The schools must comply with the bylaws
to retain their member status.89 One commentator summarizes why
universities comply with the bylaws:
[T]he universities have every incentive to comply with the NCAA's
mandates. First, to be associated with the NCAA, the member in-
stitution must agree to assist the NCAA in investigating rules viola-
tions and enforcing its rules against student-athletes. Failure to do
so may result in devastating financial consequences due to potential
NCAA sanctions imposed against the university for such failure. 90
Bechuse virtually every major university is a member of the NCAA,
the NCAA has the influence to negatively affect the reputation and
financial situation of a university who chooses to disobey its funda-
mental policies. 91
b. State Law and Regulation
In addition to the NCAA bylaws, more than half of the fifty states
have passed legislation prohibiting gifts from agents to amateur ath-
86. See Cottrell v. NCAA, 975 So.2d 306 (Ala. 2007). An agent signed an Alabama football
player in violation of NCAA bylaws. Id. at 317. The University was sanctioned and the coaches
and recruiting coordinator filed an action against the NCAA for inter alia, defamation. Id. at
318, 325. The agent was not joined in the trial and was not found liable for any legal wrongdo-
ing. Id. at 317.
87. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at § 14.11.1. According to the bylaw:
If a student-athlete is ineligible under the provisions of the constitution, bylaws or
other regulations of the Association, the institution shall be obligated to apply immedi-
ately the applicable rule and to withhold the student-athlete from all intercollegiate
competition. The institution may appeal to the Committee on Student-Athlete Rein-
statement for restoration of the student-athlete's eligibility as provided in Bylaw 14.12
if it concludes that the circumstances warrant restoration.
88. Sudia, supra note 15, at 273 ("Rather, the NCAA only indirectly regulates student-athletes
by imposing mandates on the universities (that enroll and play the student-athletes) to enforce
the NCAA regulations and sanctions on its student-athletes.").
89. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at § 1.3.2 ("Obligations of Member Institutions. Legisla-
tion governing the conduct of intercollegiate athletics programs of member institutions shall
apply to basic athletics issues such as admissions, financial aid, eligibility and recruiting. Mem-
ber institutions shall be obligated to apply and enforce this legislation, and the enforcement
procedures of the Association shall be applied to an institution when it fails to fulfill this
obligation.").
90. Sudia, supra note 15, at 273.
91. There are 326 active Division I members of the NCAA. Hofstra University Receives
NCAA Certification, GoHosrRA.COM (Aug. 20, 2009), http://www.gohofstra.com/ViewArticle.
dbml?DBOEMID=22200&ATCLID=204778575. There are over 960 total colleges and uni-
versities affiliated with the NCAA. Cox, supra note 65, at 1158.
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letes.92 Because the statutes vary in construction from state-to-state,
it is useful to group the statutes according to their method of prohibi-
tion. 93 The groupings include "absolute prohibition," "conditional
prohibition," and "prohibition on timing. '94
"Absolute prohibition" statutes explicitly prohibit an agent from
providing any sort of gift or benefit to a student-athlete. 95 However,
California is the only state that has passed a statute that completely
bans agent gifts to athletes.96 The statute provides: "No athlete agent
or athlete agent's representative shall, directly or indirectly, offer or
provide money or any other thing of benefit or value to a student
athlete." 97 The language of the statute specifically bans anything of
value passing from agent to athlete. It is somewhat surprising that
only one state employs an absolute prohibition when the NCAA ex-
pressly prohibits gifts to student-athletes. 98 California's statute is sim-
ilar to NCAA Bylaw 12.3.1.2, which bans all gifts to athletes.99
"Conditional prohibition" statutes classify gifts from agents to ath-
letes as illegal upon the occurrence of a conditional event.10 Eigh-
teen states have statutes that prohibit agents from giving gifts to
student-athletes if it is used "to induce" the athlete into signing a con-
tract with the agent. 01 Therefore, the gift is only prohibited if the
agent is trying to persuade the athlete to sign a contract with him. For
instance, the relevant Ohio statute reads in pertinent part: "No athlete
agent shall.. . [olffer anything of value to a person in order to induce
an athlete to enter into an agreement pursuant to which the athlete
agent represents the interests of the athlete."' 0 2 It is argued that this
type of statute "makes a mockery" of the attempt to prohibit gifts to
student-athletes because they may be evaded by agents who assert
92. Sudia, supra note 10, at 68.
93. Sudia, supra note 15, at 277 ("A detailed reading of the statutory provisions that do regu-
late agents gifts to athletes reveals that such provisions categorize into three basic forms. First,
some statutory provisions absolutely prohibit gifts. Second, some statutory provisions condition-
ally prohibit gifts. In other words, the gifts are prohibited only if certain conditions are met.
Third, some gifts are prohibited only if provided to the athletes during certain designated time
frames.").
94. Sudia, supra note 15, at 277-92 (discussing each category of state statutes).
95. Sudia, supra note 15, at 277.
96. Id.
97. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 18897.6 (West 2008).
98. Sudia, supra note 15, at 277.
99. See discussion supra Subsection l.B.2.a (discussing NCAA Bylaw 12.3.1.2 which bans all
gifts to athletes).
100. Sudia, supra note 15, at 278.
101. Id.
102. Oujio Rvv. Cou, ANN. § 4771.17(D) (West 2006).
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that they were not attempting to induce the athlete into signing a
contract. 103
"Prohibition on timing" statutes "prohibit agent gifts to athletes
only if the gifts occur within certain statutorily designated time
frames."'1 4 These time periods are defined as the time before the stu-
dent-athlete's college eligibility expires or up until the athlete's last
intercollegiate contest.1 05 The statutes are intended to prohibit gifts to
student-athletes while they still possess NCAA eligibility.' 0 6 An ex-
ample of this type of statute is found in Pennsylvania, whose statute
reads in pertinent part:
Prohibited Acts. An athlete agent may not:
(8) Before the student athlete's eligibility for collegiate athletics
has expired, give, offer or promise anything of value to:
(i) a student athlete;
(ii) any member of the student athlete's immediate family; or
(iii) any individual who substantially contributes to the economic
support of the student athlete.' 0 7
The time frame for the Pennsylvania statute runs until the athlete's
collegiate eligibility expires, no matter what age. 08
Louisiana has enacted a unique statute that falls outside the three
above categories. The statute allows an agent to give gifts to a stu-
dent-athlete as long as it does not result in the loss of eligibility for an
athlete or in sanctions imposed on the university. 0 9 It clearly fails to
capture the essence of the NCAA policy in terms of prohibiting gifts
103. Sudia, supra note 15, at 279. The author argues:
This 'inducement' condition makes a mockery of the statutory prohibition on agent
gifts to athletes. The only thing an agent needs to do to evade the statute is provide the
athlete with a gift without inducing contract execution or employment. True, one can
argue that the only reason an athlete agent would give an athlete anything of benefit or
value is to induce that athlete to sign with the agent. The fallacy of this argument,
however, lies with the burden of proof and superfluous language. First, as to the bur-
den of proof, one must remember that the prosecution in a criminal case must prove
the defendant agent violated the statute beyond a reasonable doubt, and the plaintiff in
a civil suit must prove the case-in-chief by a preponderance of the evidence or with
clear and convincing evidence.
104. Sudia, supra note 15, at 288.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. 5 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3313(8) (West 2008).
108. § 3313(8).
109. LA. RiEv. STAr. ANN. § 4:433 (West 2003). The Louisiana statute reads:
Unlawful Payments; Penalties.
A. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Chapter to the contrary, it shall be
unlawful for any person to make or offer a monetary payment, or anything of value to
an athlete or any other person where such offer does any one or both of the following:
SHOW ME THE MONEY
to student-athletes and maintaining NCAA athletics as an amateur
event.
Some states also employ licensing statutes that require an athlete
agent to register with the state. Ohio's statute reads as follows:
No person shall serve as an athlete agent in this state unless the
person holds a current and valid certificate of registration as an ath-
lete agent issued under section 4771.08 of the Revised Code, a tem-
porary certificate issued under section 4771.08 of the Revised Code,
or a temporary certificate of convenience issued under section
4771.09 of the Revised Code. 110
However, these registration statutes do little to punish athlete
agents from providing benefits to student-athletes.
c, Federal Acts
The federal government has also attempted to regulate athlete
agents who engage in improper conduct through passage of the Sports
Agent Responsibility and Trust Act of 2004 ("SPARTA").11 Pursu-
ant to section 7802(a)(1)(B), the Act "prohibits a sports agent from
giving anything of value to a student athlete or anyone associated with
him, until the student athlete has signed an agency contract. 112 Sec-
tion 7801 defines "athlete agent" and also defines the term "student-
athlete" similar to NCAA bylaws and state statutes)' 3 Section 7803
provides that a violation shall constitute an unfair or deceptive act or
practice and that the Federal Trade Commission will be responsible
for enforcement of SPARTA. t 4
Section 7804 provides a state cause of action against an agent who
engages in illegal conduct and gives the state attorney general the au-
(1) Causes the athlete to lose his eligibility to participate in sports sanctioned by the
federation or association of which the school or institution is a member.
(2) Causes the institution of higher education or school which the athlete attended
or was being recruited to participate in sports contests at the time the payment or thing
of value was received, to be investigated or placed on probation, penalized, or other-
wise sanctioned by the federation or association of which the school or institution is a
member.
Id.
110. Ormo REV. Corn ANN. § 4771.06 (West 2006).
111. Darren A. Heitner, Duties of Sports Agents to Athletes and Statutory Regulation Thereof,
7:3 DART. L.J. 246, 250 (2009). This Act created sections 7801-7807 under title 15 of the United
States Code. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7801-7807 (2008).
112. Id.
113. § 7801 (defining "athlete agent" as "an individual who enters into an agency contract
with a student athlete, or directly or indirectly recruits or solicits a student athlete to enter into
an agency contract" and "student athlete" as "an individual who engages in, is eligible to engage
in, or may be eligible in the future to engage in, an intercollegiate sport").
114. § 7803.
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thority to prosecute.' 15 It gives states the authority to bring a civil suit
against an agent who has tampered with one of their student-athletes
and/or harmed a state educational institution. However, section 7805
takes this a step further and provides that "an educational institution
has a right of action against an athlete agent for damages" if the ath-
lete agent and the student-athlete enter into an agency contract before
the athlete's eligibility has expired. 1 6
At first glance, SPARTA seems to provide the solution to this prob-
lem. It expressly prohibits gifts to student-athletes as well as other
actions concluded by Congress to be detrimental to collegiate athlet-
ics. 117 It grants states and the Federal Trade Commission the power of
enforcement.' 18 However, SPARTA has also failed to deter unethical
conduct any more than the state statutes currently in place.11 9
II. EXAMINATION OF WHY THE CURRENT
REGULATORY SCHEME FAILS
One of the major reasons that athlete agents have evaded prosecu-
tion for prohibited conduct towards student-athletes is because the
NCAA lacks legal authority to enforce its bylaws against agents. 120
The NCAA has no jurisdiction to bring an enforcement action against
an athlete agent for violating a bylaw because the agent is not a mem-
ber of the NCAA and lacks incentive to cooperate. This responsibility
falls upon the member universities to report the conduct to the state
or to bring an action under 15 U.S.C. § 7802.121
A. NCAA Bylaws Unenforceable
Recently, an NCAA bylaw was successfully invalidated in an Ohio
court action by a student-athlete, who was declared ineligible after an
115. § 7804.
116. § 7805. The damages available to the university may include actual losses and expenses
incurred because, as a result of the conduct of the athlete agent, the educational institution was
injured by a violation of this chapter or was penalized, disqualified, or suspended from participa-
tion in athletics by a national association for the promotion and regulation of athletics, by an
athletic conference, or by reasonable self-imposed disciplinary action taken to mitigate actions
likely to be imposed by such an association or conference.
117. § 7801.
118. §§ 7801-7807.
119. See discussion infra Section II.C (examining why federal acts have failed to deter unethi-
cal agent conduct).
120. Sudia, supra note 15, at 273 ("The NCAA, however, lacks jurisdiction to enforce its rules
against athlete agents. The NCAA must enforce its rule through its university constituents.").
121. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at § 1.3.2; see also § 7802.
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agent reported him to the NCAA. 12 2 The athlete had retained Robert
and Tim Baratta to represent him while he was contemplating bypas-
sing college to play professional baseball. 123 After the student-athlete
decided to enroll in a university, he refused to pay the Barattas for
their services. 124 Subsequently, it was uncovered that he had signed a
contract with the agents and the NCAA declared him ineligible before
an NCAA tournament baseball game. 125 The athlete filed a lawsuit
against the NCAA to restore his eligibility.126 The Ohio court ruled
that the "[n]o Agent Rule was arbitrary and capricious and NCAA
Bylaw 19.7 (the Restitution Rule) was overreaching."' 127 Eventually, a
settlement was negotiated wherein the NCAA essentially "agreed to
pay $750,000 in order to reinstitute both the No Agent and Restitu-
tion rules. ' ' 128 If a student-athlete can challenge an NCAA bylaw and
have it declared void by a court of law, it likely would not prevent an
agent from doing so as well.
B. State Statutory Weaknesses
State statutes have also failed to punish and deter athlete agents
from engaging in prohibited conduct. The statutes have been criti-
cized as unconstitutionally vague and containing many loopholes in
which agents can avoid being prosecuted or penalized. 29 The vague-
ness results from the fact that they are poorly drafted by state
legislatures.' 30
Athlete agents can also escape state statutes by asserting lack of
personal jurisdiction.13' A court of law must possess general or spe-
cific jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant for a judgment to be
122. Oliver v. NCAA, 920 N.E.2d 203 (Ct. Com. Pl. Erie County Ohio 2009) (vacated pursu-
ant to settlement).
123. Id. at 206.
124. Id. at 207.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Morgan, supra note 16, at 305.
128. Morgan, supra note 16, at 314. The Restitution rule permits the NCAA discretion to
vacate wins, awards, or championships during the time period in which the player found to have
violated NCAA bylaws participated. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at § 19.7.
129. Sudia, supra note 10, at 85-91.
130. Sudia, supra note 10, at 85. The author provides an example of poor statutory drafting:
The Oklahoma statute then includes within the definition of "athlete agent" the term
"athlete," a term that the statute does not define. The Oklahoma legislature then pro-
ceeded to define the term "Oklahoma non-NCAA athlete" and made several provi-
sions of the statute applicable only to such athletes. The end result achieved by
Oklahoma amounts to a statutory piece of artwork containing incomprehensible defini-
tions and provisions.
131. Sudia, supra note 10, at 87-88.
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valid and given full faith and credit.' 32 The problem with the statutes
is that they "flourish with unconstitutional attempts at obtaining juris-
diction over non-resident athlete agent defendants."'' 33 Most of them
attempt to stretch their jurisdiction where there is no general personal
jurisdiction, and the non-resident athlete agent lacks the requisite
minimum contacts for specific personal jurisdiction. 34 Therefore, if
an athlete agent receives a complaint from a foreign state court where
he conducted minimal business, he only need assert lack of personal
jurisdiction to escape penalty.
State statutes are also full of loopholes and exemptions which allow
athlete agents the opportunity to escape punishment. 135 An example
is one that requires the athlete agent "induce" the student-athlete into
signing an agency contract.136 This is an implicit loophole that an ath-
lete agent may claim as a defense to punishment. 137 It is nearly impos-
sible to prove the subjective intent of an athlete agent who has
knowledge that the statute includes the inducement requirement.1 38
There are many methods the agent may use to offer gifts to a student-
athlete while appearing like he did not intend to "induce" the student
athlete into signing a contract. Consider the situation in which an
agent leaves a gift at the dormitory door of a student-athlete on his
birthday without mention of signing a contract. It would be unlikely
that sufficient evidence of inducement could be offered by the prose-
cution. It cannot be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that it was left
in exchange for signing a contract. This is further complicated if the
agent employs a runner to deliver the gift without the agent's physical
presence. 139 Moreover, these state laws have been ineffective because
"there have been relatively few cases where agents have seen any real
132. Sudia, supra note 10, at 87.
133. Sudia, supra note 10, at 88.
134. Sudia, supra note 10, at 88. The author notes:
The Ohio statute serves as one of the worst abuses of due process principles. The
Ohio statute provides that 'a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over an athlete
agent who resides or engages in business outside [Ohio] as to a cause of action arising
from the athlete agent entering into an agent contract with a student-athlete outside
[Ohio] without complying with section 4771.02 of the Revised Code.
135. Sudia, supra note 10, at 89.
136. Sudia, supra note 10, at 90-91.
137. Sudia, supra note 10, at 90.
138. Sudia, supra note 10, at 91.
139. Runners are people employed by agents to make contact with student athletes without
the agent having to be present. See Dohrmann, supra note 14 (detailing how Josh Luchs and
other agents made contact with athletes).
SHOW ME THE MONEY
jail time and the prospect of fines is not a true deterrent in [the]
industry."' 40
For example, in Abernathy v. State, an Alabama appellate court re-
versed the conviction of a sports agent who gave an Auburn Univer-
sity football player monthly payments and $100 per every interception
he made.1 41 Not only did the court refuse to apply the Alabama Ath-
lete Agents Regulatory Act, but it stated that "[m]ere tampering with
a player's eligibility in violation of N.C.A.A. rules is not a criminal
offense unless done with the specific intent to influence the outcome
of a sports contest.' 42 The court went on to hold that the agent could
not be convicted of tampering and that his retrial was barred by
double jeopardy. 143 The prosecutors were accused of stretching the
four corners of the tampering statutes and the trial judge doubted that
they were even applicable to the case.' 44
C. Federal Acts No Stronger
Federal acts have also failed to prevent athlete agents from provid-
ing gifts to student-athletes. The recently enacted Sports Agent Re-
sponsibility and Trust Act of 2004 has been criticized as "no stronger
than deterrents that have already proved unsuccessful.' 45 Although
SPARTA has created a cause of action for educational institutions
against the athlete agents, "[i]t seems that the problem ties in the pen-
alties, remedies, and potential deterrents the statutes attempt to em-
ploy. 1 46 Therefore, because it is essentially a uniform set of state-like
statutes, it will likely provide no more deterrence than the state stat-
utes that are already in place. There are few, if any, cases that have
been brought under SPARTA. 147
140. Eric Willenbacher, Regulating Sports Agents: Why Current Federal and State Efforts Do
Not Deter the Unscrupulous Athlete-Agent and How a National Licensing System May Cure the
Problem, 78 Sr. JOHN's L. REv. 1225, 1237 (2004).
141. 545 So. 2d 185, 191 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988).
142. Id. at 188, 191.
143. Id. at 191.
144. Id. at 190.
145. Willenbacher, supra note 140, at 1237.
146. Willenbacher, supra note 140, at 1243 ("First, finding an unfair or deceptive act or prac-
tice affecting commerce will only cause the FTC to order the actor to cease such activity. If the
actor continues the unfair practice, the Commission may then seek a maximum civil penalty of
$11,000 for each act. This fine is certainly on par with criminal and civil penalties that already
exist on state and federal levels.").
147. This conclusion is the result of an extensive Westlaw and Lexis search for relevant cases.
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Other more creative attempts to use federal law to punish agents
have also failed, such as use of the federal mail fraud statute. 48 Two
sports agents, Norby Walters and Lloyd Bloom, were convicted in dis-
trict court, but the Seventh Circuit later reversed the conviction on
other grounds.149 However, the appellate court failed to reach a deci-
sion on the challenge to the government's novel interpretation of the
statute. 150 Therefore, some argue that the mail fraud statue may be a
creative deterrent to athlete agents with certain obvious limitations.' 51
III. THE SOLUTION
According to one commentator, "[w]hen you have people who need
to win, rules don't apply. '1 52 This statement represents the attitude of
agents who compete to sign premier college athletes. Their blatant
lack of respect for the NCAA's bylaws can be analogized to Southern
Methodist University's (SMU) booster club who paid players to play
for the football team, which resulted in the imposition of the "death
penalty."'' 5 3 During the SMU scandal, the NCAA handed down the
148. United States v. Walters, 913 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1990). The two agents were charged with
offering college football players money, cars, gifts, and trips in return for signing contracts with
the agents to represent them during their professional careers. Id. at 389. Each player signed a
post-dated contract which was kept by the agents until the players' eligibility expired. Id. at 390.
The government's argument was that the agents' "plan of signing college athletes in violation of
NCAA rules constituted a scheme to defraud universities of their property interests in athletic
scholarships." Cox, supra note 65, at 1158.
149. Walters, 913 F.2d at 939 (reversing the judgment because the trial judge failed to issue an
advice of counsel jury instruction).
150. Cox, supra note 65, at 1159.
151. Id.
152. PONY Exci-ss (ESPN Films 2010). The quote above opens the film and is spoken by the
director of Pony Excess, Thaddeus D. Matula.
153. Id. The SMU scandal involved a secret membership of SMU boosters who recruited high
school football players to sign letters of intent with the university through substantial payments
and gifts during the 1980s. Id. Numerous athletes were given upwards of $150,000 to play foot-
ball for SMU. Id. When SMU began stealing away top recruits from other national powerhouse
programs, the NCAA began investigating and found that one athlete, Sean Stopperich, had re-
ceived $5,000 and other benefits to play for SMU. Id. The NCAA placed SMU on probation
and also took action by amending the NCAA bylaws to include the "repeat violators" rule,
which later became known as the "death penalty." Id. The "death penalty" stated that if a
school was found in violation of NCAA rules twice within five years, the program would be
terminated for an entire season. Id. Within five years of the first violation, another SMU re-
cruit, who was expelled from the university due to drug abuse, appeared on national television
and confessed that he received payments to attend SMU. Id. The athlete, David Stanley, coop-
erated with the NCAA. Id. On February 25, 1987, NCAA director of enforcement, David Berst,
announced the termination of the football program for the 1987 season and allowed no more
than seven games in 1988, none of which could be played at SMU. Id. The news was so shocking
that Berst actually fainted after he had made the announcement. Id. The "death penalty" dealt
to SMU left its football program in ruins for over 20 years. Id.
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most severe punishment ever imposed on a university.154 The NCAA
terminated SMU's football season for one year and severely limited
games during the next few seasons.1 55 The rationale for the punish-
ment, as stated by NCAA investigator Dan Beebe, was that "[SMU]
just didn't get the fact that they couldn't continue to do this [violate
NCAA rules]. ' 156 Although the proposed solution may be viewed as
Draconian by current agents, it is justifiable because agents should
understand that they cannot continue to compromise college athletics
without consequence.
A. State Licensure
Although numerous states already have licensure requirements in
place, they are simply not enough. The current licensure statutes con-
tain no requirement that athlete agents also function as licensed attor-
neys. 157 Therefore, the average person who complies with skeletal
provisions of the statute may become a licensed athlete agent in that
state. If the average agent is required to be an attorney, they are con-
sequently held to a higher standard of conduct and must comply with
legal ethics rules.' 58 They are also subject to punishment.
To increase functionality of the licensing statutes, the statutes
should contain a clause that requires a person registering as an athlete
agent to be a licensed attorney. Such a clause may read:
No person shall serve as an athlete agent in [state] unless they have
obtained a Juris Doctor from a graduate law school course of study
and achieved passage of the bar examination of [state]. In addition,
no person shall become a licensed athlete agent until they have
demonstrated [compliance with state licensing standards].
The licensed attorney requirement serves many legitimate purposes
other than notification to the state of one's intent to become an ath-
lete agent. Presently, non-lawyer athlete agents arguably engage in
the unauthorized practice of law. Their ignorance of the law results in
non-lawyer agents drafting unconscionable and non-conforming con-
tracts that "typically [give] the agents full power of attorney over the
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See Orio Rirv. Corn, ANN. § 4771.06 (West 2006) (detailing the language of an Ohio
statute that does not contain any licensing requirement).
158. Johnathan J. Amoona, Top Pick: Why a Licensed Attorney Acting as a Sports Agent is a
"Can't Miss" Prospect, 21 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 599 (2008); Mark Doman, Attorneys as Athlete-
Agents: Reconciling the A BA Rules of Professional Conduct with the Practice of Athlete Repre-
sentation, 5 Tex. Rev. Ent. & Sports L. 37 (2003).
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financial matters of the player. ' 159 In an attempt to make a profit,
agents negotiate unfair contracts with student-athletes who possess lit-
tle contract knowledge and bargaining power. 160
For example, in Walters v. U.S., the athletes who entered into con-
tracts with the defendants were threatened with physical violence if
they wanted to rescind the contract. 161 It must be remembered that
college athletes are mostly young adults between the ages of eighteen
and twenty-two. These athletes have minimal experience with negoti-
ation and may be taken advantage of by an athlete agent who pres-
sures a young athlete into signing away a portion of his professional
paycheck through sophisticated sales puffery or violence. 162
Moreover, in Cottrell v. NCAA, the court described a contract be-
tween a University of Alabama football player and an agent that was
written on a napkin.163 The agreement stated the agent agreed to re-
present the student-athlete for $400.164 The athlete did not notify any-
one that he signed with an agent. 165 This is another example of the
unsophisticated nature of many agents and why attorney licensure is
necessary.
Although it is arguable that a lesser regulatory scheme may suffice,
it would not prevent the conduct that is occurring. 166 Professional li-
censing does not stop the unlicensed practice of law, and revoking li-
censes is not enough to deter agents from giving gifts to athletes. If a
shady agent loses their license, he may simply ask a friend to become
licensed just to comply with the state requirements. The unlicensed
agent can keep giving benefits to the athlete and the newly licensed
agent can give the unlicensed agent a percentage of the contract. On
the other hand, a lawyer must comply with the ethical requirements
159. Cox, supra note 65, at 1175 (noting that the Walters representation contracts failed to
meet NFLPA [National Football League Players' Association] guidelines).
160. Cox, supra note 65, at 1174 (discussing that the "secret nature of the [Walters] contracts,
combined with the players' youth and inexperience, did not provide the best setting for a fair
exchange between parties" and that the players were unsophisticated in bargaining for a repre-
sentation contract).
161. Walters v. U.S., 711 F. Supp. 1435, 1438 (N.D. III. 1989).
162. Cox, supra note 65, at 1174-75 (discussing that the athletes represented by Walters and
Bloom "had never before signed or negotiated a contract such as the one presented by [the
agents]" and the agents talked so fast they never had a chance to think for themselves).
163. Cottrell v. NCAA, 975 So.2d 306, 317 (Ala. 2007).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. For example, health professionals must be licensed to practice medicine and the state can
investigate complaints and revoke licenses. See LARA - Licensing for Health Care Profession-
als, MICIHOAN.GOV, http://www.michigan.gov/lara/0,1607,7-154-27417_27529--,00.html (last vis-
ited July 6, 2011).
SHOW ME THE MONEY
the profession entails and stands to lose more than his license - his
ability to practice law.
B. State Adoption of Model Rule 8.4
Most importantly, requiring athlete agents to become attorneys
grants state bar associations the authority to bring an action before an
ethics committee for a violation of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. 67 Lawyers must comply with the Model Rules,1 68 but only
because the state has adopted some form of them through its highest
court. 169 The Model Rules and the American Bar Association (ABA)
have no authority to discipline lawyers and no control over the state's
own ethical rules.170 Because representing an athlete will be consid-
ered within the scope of their duties as an attorney, state bar associa-
tions can discipline lawyer agents who violate any of the Model Rules
which the state has adopted. 71 For example, Model Rule 8.3 provides
that lawyers must report misconduct by other lawyers, which imposes
a greater duty on lawyer agents.172 Not only will agents face discipline
for their own actions, but they may be held accountable for actions of
other agents whom they know engage in misconduct.
Although no Model Rule addresses the issue of agents conferring
benefits upon student-athletes, Model Rule 8.4 provides the means of
discipline. First, to become binding, states should adopt Model Rule
8.4173 so enforcement can be sought by state bar associations. Other-
167. LISA G. LIRMAN & Piinip G. SCI-IRAG, ETIIICAL PIROBLI-MS IN THE PRIACI-ICE o1 LAw
25 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2008) (noting that state courts delegate authority to regulate
the conduct of the lawyers within its state to the state bar association).
168. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct are drafted by the American Bar Association
to govern the conduct of lawyers. An ABA committee of lawyers and scholars drafts a rule
which is then debated, amended, and eventually passed by the ABA. The state's highest court
can then accept, reject, or amend the rule to incorporate state policies. Id. at 27-28.
169. Gillers, supra note 66, at 3.
170. Id.
171. Lerman, supra note 167, at 25-26 (discussing that state bar associations establish discipli-
nary committees called "bar counsels or disciplinary counsels").
172. Lerman, supra note 167, at 97-98.
173. Model Rule 8.4 states:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (a) Violate or attempt to violate the
Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so
through the acts of another; (b) Commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the
lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; (c) Engage in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; (d) Engage in conduct
that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; (e) State or imply an ability to influ-
ence improperly a government agency or official or to achieve results by means that
violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law; or (0 Knowingly assist a judge
or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable rule of judicial conduct or
other law.
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wise, the rule is powerless until adopted by the state. 174 This is done
by the highest court in the state, which is responsible for promulgating
the rules that govern lawyer conduct within its borders. 75 State
courts delegate some responsibility of enforcement upon the state bar
association.176 State bar associations often create disciplinary agen-
cies made up of lawyers called "bar counsel's offices," which investi-
gate and prosecute misconduct. 77 Rule 8.4 should be adopted
because it is a sound catch-all rule that can be used to target agent
lawyers who act unethically and prosecute them for fines, sanctions, or
even disbarment. As one commentator notes:
This provision is a kind of catch-all that exhorts people to act honor-
ably, without defining the behavior that could cause a lawyer to be
disciplined or even disbarred. It has been challenged on the ground
that it is unconstitutionally vague, but all of the challenges have
been rejected by the courts.178
Subsections (b) and (c) provide the most teeth to punish agent law-
yers who provide gifts to student-athletes. Violating NCAA bylaws or
lying to NCAA investigators would constitute a violation of subsec-
tion (c) because it involves dishonesty and deceit. 179 Moreover, any
violation of a state athlete agent statute would suffice as a violation of
the rule under subsection (b); committing a criminal act that reflects
poorly on the lawyer's honesty. 80
Model Rule 8.4, is unlikely to be invalidated with claims of uncon-
stitutional vagueness, over-breadth, or lack of personal jurisdiction. 181
Most states already have some form of Rule 8.4 adopted into their
legislation with amendments or deletions.' 82 Universities, parents,
Moi)Ii_ Rui .is oiF PROF'L CONiucr R. 8.4 (2002).
174. Gillers, supra note 66, at 3.
175. Lerman, supra note 167, at 20 (noting that the state's highest court is responsible for
enforcement of the rules and that the courts consult the state bar association when drafting the
rules).
176. Lerman, supra note 167, at 25.
177. Lerman, supra note 167, at 26.
178. Lerman, supra note 167, at 726.
179. See infra note 184 and accompanying text (discussing NCAA's investigative procedures).
180. Many of the state statutes provide for a civil cause of action against the agent but also
make it a criminal act to violate a section of the state's athlete agent statute. For example,
providing "transportation, material goods, or any other services to an athlete" is a first degree
misdemeanor in Ohio. Omio Ri-v. CoDra ANN. §§ 4771.17(K), 4771.99(A) (West 2006).
181. Many of the state versions of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Responsibility have
been challenged as "vague" and "overbroad," but these claims have failed. See Gentile v. State
Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1075-78 (1991) (holding that ABA Model Rule 3.6 was not over-
broad or vague); see also People v. Meier, 954 P.2d 1068, 1071 (Colo. 1998) (holding that Colo-
rado's version of Model Rule 8.4 was not unconstitutionally vague).
182. For example, Ohio has adopted Model Rule 8.4 but adds 8.4(g)-(h), making it profes-
sional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in any conduct that discriminates according to race,
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coaches, and athletes may then report improper conduct to the
NCAA or state bar associations and disciplinary committees may
sanction athlete agents who violate NCAA rules.183
Additionally, this will help the NCAA investigation process. The
NCAA investigates allegations of possible violations itself.18 4 Be-
cause the NCAA cannot force witnesses to cooperate or obtain sub-
poenas, it often deals with untruthful and reluctant witnesses. 185 As
previously noted, current athlete agents cannot be punished by the
NCAA. 86 Therefore, they have little incentive to truthfully respond
to investigators attempting to uncover wrongdoing. However, if ath-
lete agents are lawyers, they would be required to respond truthfully
and cooperate under Model Rules 8.3 and 8.4.187
C. Disbarment as the "Death Penalty" for Athlete Agents
After almost a decade of repeatedly violating NCAA rules by pay-
ing football players, SMU was dealt the "death penalty."' 88 As put by
one member of the Dallas media, "[t]he death penalty was a horrible
penalty, but something had to stop what was going on at SMU."'1 89 In
the aftermath, the "death penalty" put an end to the booster payoffs,
but left a college football program in shambles for over two de-
cades.190 Nonetheless, the SMU situation provides an example of how
to effectively prevent NCAA violations. In regard to the current case
of unethical agents, something has to stop what continues to occur
throughout college athletics.
The state bar associations punish lawyers who violate the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct by issuing a private or public repri-
mand, fines, or even disbarment. 91 In order for this system to effec-
tively deter unethical behavior by athlete agents, punishment for
religion, etc., and any conduct that "adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice law."
Gillers, supra note 66, at 503.
183. See discussion infra Section 1I.C (briefly describing how disciplinary committees disbar
lawyers).
184. Michelle B. Hosick, Many NCAA Infractions Cases Move Quickly, But Complications
Can Slow the Process, NCAA.oRG, (Dec. 1, 2010) http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/
NCAA/About+the+NCAA/How+We+WorkEnforcement+process/Infractions (detailing the
process by which the NCAA investigates possible violations and noting that the NCAA does not
possess the same authority as a court of law).
185. Id.
186. See discussion supra Subsection I.B.2.a.
187. See discussion supra Section lII.A.
188. PONY Excrss, supra note 152.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Lerman, supra note 167, at 75.
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providing gifts to a college athlete should range from suspension of
the agent license to complete disbarment as an attorney. As previ-
ously noted, fines have not been an effective deterrent in this
industry. 192
For example, the North Carolina State Bar has the power to repri-
mand and disbar lawyers who violate the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct.' 93 In North Carolina State Bar v. Alston, Jr., the North Car-
olina Bar Association punished a lawyer who violated multiple profes-
sional responsibility rules by disbarring him.' 94 Because the lawyer
misappropriated his client's funds and there was a pattern of miscon-
duct and multiple offenses, he was disbarred and ordered to pay the
fees for the action against him.1 95 This method will be effective at
punishing lawyer agents who continually violate NCAA rules.
Although the above requirements and punishment seem drastic,
they provide a solution to the current problem. Critics will argue this
strategy is too burdensome on current athlete agents, requiring an in-
vestment of tens of thousands of dollars for law school.' 96 It will also
entail states to amend or create licensing statutes. 97 However, the
benefits substantially outweigh the burdens. These strict standards
will effectively eliminate those who do not possess the ethical stan-
dards required to be a responsible agent. It will also create a higher
standard of competency in the athlete agent profession. Law schools
teach ethics and the importance of maintaining a professional reputa-
tion, not only for one's own benefit, but for the benefit of the profes-
sion.' 98 Viewed from a utilitarian perspective, it is more important to
protect the numerous student-athletes and universities that make col-
lege athletics entertaining.
192. See discussion supra Section II.B (noting that fines and threats of jail time have not
solved the problem).
193. See North Carolina State Bar v. Alston, Jr., No. 08 DHC 11, 1 (N.C. Disciplinary Hearing
2008) available at http://www.ncbar.gov/orders/08dhcll.pdf.
194. Id. at 32-34.
195. Id. at 33-34.
196. The cost of a J.D. from a top-tier law school can exceed $150,000. James Vescovi, Why
Does Law School Cost So Much? COLUMBIA LAW ScitooL, http://www.law.columbia.edu/law-
school/communications/reports/summer06/lawschoolcost (last visited Feb. 22, 2011).
197. See discussion supra Section III.A (explaining the need for states to adopt or amend
licensure requirements for agents).
198. It is argued that the occupation of law is self-regulating which promotes competency and
assures the public that lawyers are trustworthy and not self-interested. STE'HEN GILLERS, Rico-
ULIATION OF LAWYERS: PROB-1MS 017 LAW AND ETt ics, 15 (Vicki Been et al, eds,, 8th ed. 2009).
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D. Incentivized Reporting: A Circular Balance of Powers
Allegations of wrongdoing must be reported to the NCAA and the
bar associations so sanctions can be administered and wrongful con-
duct deterred. As Oklahoma head football coach Bob Stoops men-
tioned,199 the current system provides little incentive for student-
athletes, coaches, parents, and university administration to report alle-
gations.2 0 0  Reporting that a student-athlete took a benefit from an
agent reflects poorly on the university and its coaches and may result
in NCAA sanctions. 20 I The student-athlete does not want to report
misconduct because she will face suspension or loss of eligibility.202
Furthermore, parents and friends do not want to cause the athlete to
lose his or her scholarship or playing time.
The SMU scandal reached its breaking point when former player
David Stanley was refused readmission into SMU so he could com-
plete his degree.20 3 After he was denied admission, he cooperated
with the NCAA. 20 4 Dale Hansen of WFAA Dallas, who reported the
David Stanley story, described it accordingly: "When a booster thinks
he buys the athlete, the problem is the athlete actually owns him. '205
This is the type of scenario that should be created with regard to ath-
lete agents. Currently, if an athlete agent provides a student-athlete
with a car to induce the athlete to sign with the agent, the agent
"owns" the athlete because the athlete is also violating NCAA
rules.20 6 If the athlete reports the agent, he is reporting himself. No
athlete wishes to turn themselves in to the NCAA. While the agent
may lose the athlete, he will most likely not face any harsh penalties
for his behavior.
199. See ESPN.coM, supra note 51.
200. See Cottrell v. NCAA, 975 So.2d 306 (Ala. 2007) (noting that the athlete failed to dis-
close the fact that he had signed with an agent to the university); see also ESPN.cOM, supra note
51 (mentioning Stoops' suggestion that there is no incentive for players).
201. See Witz, supra note 9 (discussing the sanctions dealt to USC by the NCAA in the after-
math of the Reggie Bush scandal).
202. See Beard, supra note 6 (detailing the dismissal of two UNC football players after they
were found to have received improper benefits from an agent).
203. Stanley was a paid recruit who was removed from the team and expelled from SMU after
drug abuse. Pony Excess, supra note 152. He accepted his removal from the team but asked
SMU administration that they reinstate him into school so he could finish his degree. Id. SMU
refused and he decided to blow the whistle on the entire scandal, which eventually caused SMU
to receive the "death penalty." Id.
204. Pony Excess, supra note 152.
205. Id.
206. The student athlete will also violate NCAA Bylaw 12.3.1.2 for accepting a gift from an
agent and will be declared ineligible for athletic competition. NCAA MANUAL, supra note t, at
§ 12.3.1.2.
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To solve this problem, student-athletes should be granted immunity
for their wrongdoing in order to incentivize reporting agent miscon-
duct, a solution also endorsed by Bob Stoops.2 0 7 Immunity should
only be granted if the athlete reports their actions before they are
caught or fully cooperate with the investigation when they are caught.
The student-athlete must then issue a public apology for his actions
and donate the ill-gained benefits to a charitable organization. This
retribution coincides with NCAA Bylaw 16.01.1.1, which allows an
athlete who receives a benefit of $100 or less to return the benefit to
charity to regain their eligibility.208 However, the $100 limit should be
removed to allow for benefits of any monetary value to qualify. If
student-athletes can repent past wrongs, they will be much more likely
to report the agents who exploit the system.
It can be argued this regime creates no incentive for student-ath-
letes to refuse benefits from agents. Assuming, arguendo, there is no
incentive, this regime creates a much larger problem for the agents
and shifts the burden onto them. The athlete can report the agent to
the NCAA, who will in turn be able to report to the state bar and
bring an enforcement action. Therefore, it becomes too precarious for
athlete agents to confer gifts upon student-athletes. The athlete now
has the power to demand more money, reinforced by threats that he
will report the agent's wrongdoing to the proper authority. "When
you give a player the leverage of they know you paid them and you
know you paid them, that's the leverage you don't want a college kid
to have, and then to go take something away from them, they're going
to use that leverage on you. ' 20 9 The student-athletes become de facto
whistleblowers. With the risks of disbarment looming, lawyer agents
will think twice about offering benefits to collegiate athletes.
It may be further argued that this system will fail to catch athletes
and agents in collusion where the violation may never be uncovered.
If an athlete accepts benefits from an agent and is satisfied, he will
never report the violation if he is never caught. In turn, the agent will
also never disclose the behavior. Realistically, many of these "per-
fect" schemes are unlikely to succeed because college sports are
highly scrutinized by the media.210
207. See ESPN.coM, supra note 51 (pointing out that Stoops believes players should be
granted amnesty).
208. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at § 16.01.1.1.
209. Stated by Dick Anderson, SMU defensive tackle, 1986. Pony Excess, supra note 152.
210. Ethan J. Skolnick, In Modern Sports Coverage, It's All Fair Game, NBCSIORrS.COM
(Aug. 4, 2008), http://nbcsports.msnbc.com/id/25998182/ (noting that athletes' lives are not pri-
vate anymore and that once an athlete becomes a public figure, everything is open for scrutiny).
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These incentives should also apply to coaches. In the midst of the
Reggie Bush scandal, Pete Carroll was accused of turning his head
while the violations took place and resigned as USC's coach just
before the scandal broke.211 Coaches do not wish to expose their
players' wrongdoings because it leads to loss of scholarships, loss of
postseason games, and bad publicity for the university and team.212
If a player notifies the coach and the coach reports the violation, the
coach should also be granted immunity. A complex situation arises
when an athlete conceals his reception of benefits, but the coach sub-
sequently discovers the conduct. In this case, the coach will likely be
looking out for his job and his team. If he suspects that the NCAA
will sanction the team for reporting the misconduct, he is less likely to
disclose. However, the coach has incentive to report if the NCAA is
only able to sanction the agent. If the coach reports the conduct, he
will save his team from NCAA sanctions while the player and agent
will bear the punishment for their actions. In addition, the possibility
that an athlete will be singled out and embarrassed for wrongdoing
further incentivizes compliance. This circular balance of powers may
solve this widespread problem.
E. The Reggie Bush Scandal Revisited
The Reggie Bush scandal rocked the college football world and re-
sulted in one of the stiffest punishments handed down by the
NCAA.2 13 Today, Bush has moved on and is now a prominent NFL
player and 2010 Super Bowl champion. 21 4 USC, on the other hand, is
still facing the repercussions of Bush's actions.215 Because many of
the details have been released, it is useful to examine how this scandal
could have been prevented and mitigated if the proposed measures
were in place.
211. O'Neill, supra note 8. The situation with Pete Carroll abruptly leaving USC before the
Reggie Bush scandal broke is similar to SMU head football coach Ron Meyer leaving for the
NFL while the NCAA was investigating SMU for recruiting violations. Skip Bayless, a member
of the Dallas media described it as, "Ron Meyer made a move to exit stage right before the stuff
hit the fan." Pony Excess, supra note 152. Another commentator described it as, "The posse
was getting close. The NCAA investigation was heating up and Ron Meyer left just in time." Id.
212. See Witz, supra note 9 (listing the sanctions imposed on the USC football team for
NCAA violations).
213. See discussion infra Section I.A.
214. Steven Vine, Saints Win Super Bowl, Beat Colts 31-17, HUFFINGTONPOSr.coM (Feb. 8,
2010 6:46 AM) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/02/07/saints-win-super-bowl-bea-n_452902.
html.
215. See discussion infra Section I.A.
2011]
92 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. [Vol. 8:63
Bush was provided prohibited benefits in excess of $100,000 from
agents Michael Ornstein, Lloyd Lake, and Michael Michaels.21 6 This
is a violation of NCAA Bylaw 12.3.1.2, which prohibits the acceptance
of gifts by a student-athlete from an agent.217 Both Bush and his fam-
ily were provided benefits, 218 creating a situation in which the family
does not want to report the agent misconduct because they are also
indebted to the agent. If the family reports the misconduct, the bene-
fits are taken away and Bush will be ineligible to play. Bush obviously
does not want to report his wrongdoing because he knows he will put
himself and his team at risk. In this context, the agent has the power
to report Bush to the NCAA if Bush decides to quit cooperating.2 19
Bush will then be ineligible to play and USC will be investigated by
the NCAA.
If Bush knew that he would have been immune from sanctions, this
may have drastically changed the outcome. He may have decided to
come clean with what he had received from the agents. This would
have prevented the NCAA from severely sanctioning USC and tar-
nishing Bush's legacy. 220 He would have been able to report the
agents' misconduct while saving himself from ineligibility and the
agents would be subject to disciplinary action.
There was speculation that Pete Carroll knew about the benefits as
well. 221 If he could have saved his star player from ineligibility, 222 he
may have persuaded Bush to come clean. This creates an incentive for
Pete Carroll to put a stop to the benefits in order to save his team, his
university, and maybe his job. Because Ornstein, Lake, and Michaels
would be required to be licensed attorneys under the new system, they
would be subject to a disciplinary action by the state bar for, inter alia,
a violation of Model Rule 8.4. If the conduct was found to be a severe
violation by the NCAA, they would be disbarred and never represent
a student-athlete again.
Meanwhile, Bush would return the benefits he received to the char-
ity of his choice.223 He would be able to continue his illustrious col-
216. Robinson, supra note 37.
217. See discussion supra Section l.B.2.a (discussing NCAA bylaws that prohibit gifts from
agents).
218. Robinson, supra note 37 (noting that benefits were given to Bush and his family).
219. See discussion supra Section HlI.D (explaining the balance of power between the athletes
and agents).
220. See discussion supra Section L.A (detailing the NCAA sanctions dealt to USC).
221. See O'Neil, supra note 8 (criticizing Pete Carroll's actions).
222. Immunity is proposed for players and coaches who report misconduct. See discussion
supra III.D.
223. See discussion supra Section I.D (arguing that athletes should be granted immunity for
their actions if they return the benefits to charity and issue a public apology).
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lege football career, enter the NFL draft, and earn a legitimate salary.
He would not have returned his Heisman Trophy224 and USC would
not have forfeited their 2004 BCS National Championship. 225 The
USC football team would not have lost scholarships or postseason
bowl appearances. Moreover, Pete Carroll would not be criticized in
the media for turning a blind eye to the scandal. 226 Instead of a vil-
lain, Bush might be viewed as a hero. He might be recognized as the
athlete who put his team and university ahead of himself. Bush's leg-
acy as an outstanding college running back would live on and his brief
transgressions might soon be forgotten.
CONCLUSION
If the NCAA intends to maintain its policy of amateur student-ath-
letes and prevent further tarnishing of its reputation, then stricter pen-
alties must be implemented. In the 1980s, the NCAA put a stop to
SMU boosters who paid athletes to play for their football team by
enforcing the "death penalty. '227 Although the punishment involved
boosters, it can be used as a paradigm to solve the current agent prob-
lem. With new allegations of NCAA violations emerging frequently,
the law must adapt to the current situation surrounding college athlet-
ics. The "death penalty" must be dealt to agents who continually pro-
vide benefits to student-athletes and ignore NCAA regulations. The
proffered solution, requiring agents to be licensed attorneys, promotes
accountability for wrongdoing agents and effective deterrence of pro-
hibited behavior in an inherently unethical and competitive climate.
Chris J. Evanoff*
224. See supra note 12 (noting that USC has returned Bush's Heisman trophy in an effort to
restore its reputation).
225. See Zinser, supra note 30 (reporting that the NCAA stripped USC of its 2004 national
championship due to the conduct of Reggie Bush during his tenure as a USC running back).
226. O'Neil, supra note 8.
227. Pony Excess, supra note 152.
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